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Abstract 
Gaining access to health insurance in childhood has been associated with improved childhood 
health and educational attainment.  Expansions in health insurance access have steadily lowered 
the rates of uninsured children and may have long term consequences for adult health and well-
being.  This paper analyzes the impact of gaining health insurance in childhood on health and 
economic outcomes during adulthood using dynamic microsimulation. We find disease 
prevalence at age 65 falls for most chronic conditions, with the exception of cancer.  We also 
find increased access to health insurance in childhood results in 11 additional months of life 
expectancy and 16 additional months lived free of disability.  There is no change in total lifetime 
medical spending, although both Medicaid and Medicare expenditures fall.  Lifetime earnings 
increase by about 8 percent for individuals who gain the benefits of childhood health insurance.   
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1. Introduction 
There are multiple channels through which health insurance may affect an individual’s 
health and economic status. For example, health insurance may increase use of preventive care, 
leading to better disease prevention and better health. Individuals with disease may rely on health 
insurance to obtain and finance critically needed curative care thereby improving their health.  
Further, being healthy may lead to increased educational attainment and ultimately to higher 
rates of employment, and higher wages.  In addition, health insurance may raise economic status 
directly by decreasing the cost of health care.  Health insurance may affect individuals in myriad 
ways and having access to health insurance early in life may improve the likelihood of its having 
long term beneficial effects.  
In a recent literature review, we documented the large body of work studying the effects 
of health insurance on health and economic outcomes (Gaudette et al. (2016)).  Several studies 
have examined the impact of access to childhood health insurance on outcomes.  Some evidence 
from studies on childhood health expansions (e.g. Medicaid) have shown a positive impact on 
health outcomes (Currie and Gruber (1996a); Bronchetti (2014); Boudreaux et al. (2016); Miller 
and Wherry (2015)) including reductions in avoidable hospitalizations and child mortality, while 
other studies show no impact on health (Newhouse et al. (1993), De la Mata (2012)).  In 
addition, there is evidence that improved health among children who gain access to health 
insurance through Medicaid or other state programs translates into educational gains (Cohodes et 
al. (2016); Brown et al. (2015)).  If access to childhood health insurance improves childhood 
health and educational attainment, there is also the potential for positive impact on adult health, 
productivity and economic well-being.    
We analyze the life-cycle impacts of having health insurance as a child on adult health 
and economic outcomes using the Future Americans Model (FAM), an economic-demographic 
microsimulation model that follows Americans age 25 and older and projects their lifetime 
health and economic outcomes. This methodological approach allows estimation of health 
insurance’s impact on competing risk factors of disease as well as economic outcomes.  We 
quantify the effects of childhood health insurance on medical spending, health outcomes, labor 
market outcomes, and government program participation.  
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We compare simulated outcomes in the intervention scenario, in which all uninsured 
children gain health insurance, to outcomes under the status quo.  We identify individuals who 
were most likely to have been uninsured during childhood among a nationally representative 
cohort of young Americans and in simulations of the intervention scenario, assume increases in 
the likelihood of access to childhood health insurance among these individuals.  Because having 
health insurance in childhood is not random, we utilize empirical estimates of the effects of 
childhood health insurance on outcomes based on studies of health insurance employing 
methodology that yield causal findings.  We model two pathways in which access to health 
insurance in childhood may impact long-term health and economic outcomes:  one, through 
increases in high school graduation rates and college completion; and two, through 
improvements in health through a decrease in the likelihood of having high blood pressure in 
young adulthood.   
We found that there would be substantial changes to both health and economic outcomes 
if every child had health insurance.  Under the scenario of newly acquired access to childhood 
health insurance, the subset of newly insured individuals saw reductions of incidence of stroke, 
cardiovascular disease, and diabetes at age 65.  Over their lifetimes, these gains translated into 11 
additional months of life expectancy and an expected 16 additional months lived free of 
disability.  We found that both the education and improved chronic conditions components of the 
intervention were important contributors of these gains.  Our simulations showed that there 
would be no change in total medical spending:  The increase in additional spending due to 
increased longevity was offset by reductions in health spending due to avoided chronic 
conditions.  However, both Medicare and Medicaid spending declined while private 
consumption of health care increased.  In addition, there was an 8 percent increase in lifetime 
earnings.  The percent of uninsured children is small relative to the population, thus the impact of 
the intervention was modest for the nationally representative cohort as a whole. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we briefly describe the related 
literature on health insurance. Second, we describe our methodology based on the dynamic micro 
simulation model, the FAM, and the scenarios implemented in our simulations. Third, we present 
simulation results. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our results and additional 
research needed on health insurance reform. 
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2. Previous Literature  
This paper extends the literature that studies lasting consequences of childhood 
circumstances.  More specifically, we focus on the lasting effects of access to health insurance 
during childhood.  This literature studies two main types of outcomes: health and economic. We 
contribute to both by simulating long-run effects of access to health insurance during childhood 
based on robust findings from prior literature.   
There is a growing literature that considers how health insurance during childhood affects 
health outcomes.  In a series of seminal papers, Currie & Gruber (1996a, 1996b) used Medicaid 
expansions as exogenous variation to show that Medicaid eligibility decreased infant and child 
mortality.  Following this, Howell et al. (2010) found that Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility was 
associated with a reduction in external-cause mortality but not internal-cause mortality.  Both 
Wherry & Meyer (2016) and Brown et al. (2015) found that access to health insurance earlier in 
life affects mortality during adolescence and young-adulthood.  Beyond mortality, findings are 
more mixed.  For example, both Currie, Decker, & Lin (2008) as well as Miller & Wherry 
(2015) find that eligibility at certain ages but not others may improve self-reported health later in 
life.  In addition, Miller & Wherry (2015), Boudreaux et al. (2016), and Bronchetti (2014) find 
that access to health insurance during childhood may improve chronic conditions later in life.   
There is also a recent line of literature that studies the effects of health insurance during 
childhood on economic outcomes.  Using IRS tax return data, Brown et al. (2015) found that 
eligibility during childhood increased cumulative tax payments at age 18 as well as earnings at 
ages 19-28.  These findings were concentrated on females.  Miller & Wherry (2015)  also found 
that prenatal Medicaid eligibility caused increased earnings later in life.  A related finding from 
Brown et al. (2015) is that individuals who were eligible for Medicaid during childhood receive 
lower cumulative EITC payments by age 27.  One channel that could explain this is the effect of 
childhood health insurance on educational outcomes.  Cohodes et al. (2016) found that having 
access to Medicaid during childhood decreased the high school drop-out rate by 4 percent as well 
as increased the probability of obtaining a 4-year college degree by 2.5 percent.  This is 
somewhat in line with Brown et al. (2015), who found that female eligible were more likely to 
have ever attended college.  Exploiting the same set of expansions to Medicaid that Brown et al. 
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and Cohodes et al. use, Miller & Wherry (2015) also find an increase in high school graduation 
rates due to prenatal eligibility.   
In addition to the literature that studies the effects of childhood health insurance on later-
in-life outcomes, this study is related to two other distinct literature branches. The first is the 
economic literature that uses structural modeling to evaluate the impact of health insurance 
reform. This branch focuses on the economic and distributional impact of increasing access to 
public health insurance, and typically does not consider health as an outcome. Examples include 
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013), which develops and calibrates an overlapping generations 
model to evaluate the impact of the recent health insurance reform on welfare. In this study, 
spending on health has no impact on future health, length of life, or other individual 
characteristics. Similarly, Pohl (2014) builds a partial equilibrium model in which health 
insurance only enters the utility function, and does enter the health transition model. Recently, 
Jung and Tran (2016) incorporated a Grossman (1972) health capital demand in a general 
equilibrium model to study the Affordable Care Act. However, health is assumed to have no 
impact on mortality and productivity. The study focused on the crowding-out of private health 
insurance, output, and distributional impact of the reform. Since we rely on microsimulation 
methods, this research differs from this literature by producing granular health and economic 
outcomes of increased health insurance at the individual level. This allows for rich heterogeneity 
in inputs and outputs.  The microsimulation approach we use however, does not account for 
general equilibrium effects accounted for by some of the structural literature. 
The second branch uses a state-transition approach to estimate the impact of health 
insurance on health. For instance, Li, Bruen, Lantz, and Mendez (2015) relied on two distinct 
pieces of empirical evidence to find the likely health impact of insurance expansions for 
hypertensive individuals. The first is the empirical evidence on the impact of insurance coverage 
on the use of antihypertensive medication; the second on the impact of antihypertensive 
medication on cardiovascular events and mortality. By joining these two pieces together, they 
estimate the impact of increased health insurance on heart diseases, stroke, and cardiovascular-
related deaths. Snider et al. (2016) used a similar approach to evaluate the budget and welfare 
impact of restraining eligibility for AIDS drug assistance programs. More broadly, a chapter of a 
2009 report by the Institute of Medicine used a thorough literature review to evaluate the likely 
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impact of insurance via its increased access to timely diagnosis of conditions, preventive 
services, health care, and medication (Institute of Medicine, 2009). This literature is informative 
of likely mechanisms through which health insurance can improve health, but relies on the 
assumption that newly insured individuals will derive the same health benefits as the populations 
studied when evaluating the effectiveness of drugs and medical services. By only relying on the 
causal estimates of health insurance on health and economic outcomes identified by our literature 
review, we avoid making such an assumption.  
By building on findings from the literature and utilizing the estimates of the effects of 
childhood health insurance on completed education and chronic conditions in our 
microsimulation model, we extend the literature in several ways.  First, we estimate a 
counterfactual and study the effects of policies that have not actually been implemented.  This 
helps inform future policy decisions.  Second, by using dynamic microsimulation, we predict 
outcomes much later in life than previous literature has been able to observe.  Finally, we 
quantify changes in health, as well as health spending and economic outcomes throughout the 
life course.  
3. Methods 
3.1 The Future Americans Model 
We conduct simulations using the Future Americans Model (FAM), a dynamic 
microsimulation model designed to follow Americans ages 25 and older and project their health, 
medical spending, and other outcomes over time. Conceptually, the FAM is quite similar to its 
predecessor, the Future Elderly Model (FEM), a model developed by Goldman et al. to forecast 
the implications of different medical technology scenarios on elderly health and health care 
spending (Goldman et al. (2004)). The FEM uses the Health and Retirement Study as its core 
data source and model how a nationally representative of Americans over age 50 age; how their 
health and economic status over their remaining life.  The FEM has been utilized in 
approximately 55 peer-reviewed manuscripts, including two special issues of Health Affairs.  
The FAM expands upon its predecessor (FEM) and produces estimates on the health and 
economic outcomes of individuals age 25 and older. For each individual, the model takes into 
account demographic characteristics and health conditions to project health and disease, health 
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behaviors, disability status, program participation, and medical spending.  We use data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and 
the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).  We describe the model and methods briefly 
here; a complete technical appendix containing details on the modeling is available online.1 
The FAM is a dynamic microsimulation model that follows the evolution of individual-
level health trajectories and economic outcomes rather than the average or aggregate 
characteristics of a cohort. The FAM has three core modules (see Figure 1). The first, shown at 
the top of the figure, is the Replenishing Cohorts module, which predicts economic and health 
outcomes of new cohorts of 25 yearolds with data from the PSID, and incorporates trends in 
demography, disease, body-mass index, smoking, and pensions based on data from external 
sources, such as National Health Interview Survey and the American Community Survey. This 
module generates cohorts as the simulation proceeds, so that we can measure outcomes for the 
age 25+ population in any given year.  
The second component is the Health Transition module, which uses the longitudinal 
structure of the PSID to calculate transition probabilities across various health states, including 
chronic conditions, functional status, body-mass index, and mortality, using linear and nonlinear 
multivariate regression models. These transition probabilities depend on a battery of predictors: 
age, sex, education, race, ethnicity, smoking behavior, marital status, employment, and health 
conditions. Baseline factors such as parental education and childhood health are also controlled 
for using a series of initial health variables measured at age 25. FAM transitions produce a large 
set of simulated outcomes.  
Health conditions are derived from PSID survey questions and include diabetes, high 
blood pressure, heart disease, cancer (except skin cancer), stroke or transient ischemic attack, 
and lung disease (either or both chronic bronchitis and emphysema). The concept of chronic 
conditions used in the simulations corresponds to having ever been diagnosed with a condition. 
We thus treat chronic conditions as absorbing: Once individuals receive a diagnosis, they are 
henceforth considered to have that condition.  The body-mass index variable is based on the self-
reported height and weight of PSID respondents, and its evolution is projected with the estimates 
                                                 
1 See https://healthpolicy.box.com/v/FAMTechdoc 
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of a log-linear model. Functional status is measured by limitations in instrumental activities of 
daily living or activities of daily living. The instrumental activities of daily living limitations 
indicator is based on questions about difficulty using the phone, managing money, and taking 
medications. The activities of daily living limitations indicator is based on respondents’ 
assessment of their ability to conduct basic tasks, such as dressing, eating, and bathing. For the 
purpose of this study, we consider individuals disability free if they reported no limitations, and 
as disabled if they reported at least one limitation. Unlike health conditions, we allow for 
transitions in and out of functional states. 
Finally, the Policy Outcomes module combines individual-level outcomes into aggregate 
outcomes, such as medical care costs (Medicare, Medicaid, and private), Disability insurance 
benefits, and Social Security expenditures and contributions.  To calculate a value for both 
disability and Social Security claiming, we use average monthly benefit amounts by age and 
gender for 2014 and apply them to each year forecasted.  We assume no growth in either 
disability or Social Security benefits and so this is likely an underestimate of the true changes in 
these benefits.  Individual health spending is predicted with regard to health status (chronic 
conditions and functional status), demographics (age, sex, race, ethnicity, and education), 
nursing home status, and mortality.  Health spending estimates are based on spending data from 
the MEPS for individuals age 64 and younger and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey for 
individuals age 65 and older, who constitute the bulk of the Medicare population. Our definition 
of medical spending includes medical provider visits, hospital events, inpatient stays, outpatient 
visits, emergency department visits, dental care, home health care, optometry, other medical 
equipment and services, prescribed medicines, and nursing home stay. Our estimates are based 
on spending data from the 2007-2010 MEPS and the 2007-2010 MCBS. The estimates are based 
on pooled least squares regressions of each spending type on risk factors, self-reported 
conditions, and functional status, with spending inflated to current dollars using the medical 
component of the consumer price index. 
An example of how the three modules interact is as follows. For year 2009, the model 
begins with the population of Americans age 25 and older based on nationally representative data 
from the PSID. Individual-level health and economic outcomes for the next two years are 
predicted using the Policy Outcomes module. The cohort is then aged two years using the Health 
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Transition Module. Aggregate health and functional status outcomes for those years are then 
calculated. At that point, a new cohort of 25-year-olds is introduced into the 2011 population 
using the Replenishing Cohort module, and they join those who survived from 2009 to 2011. 
This forms the age 25+ population for 2016. The transition model is then applied to this 
population. The same process is repeated until reaching the last year of the simulation. 
3.2 Simulations 
In this study, we report results from a cohort simulation, in which we follow a single 
cohort of Americans until death under alternative health insurance scenarios. These simulations 
focus on a representative cohort of Americans ages 25 to 26 in 2009. In each period, the Policy 
Outcomes module predicts medical expenditure based on an individual’s current health and 
economic outcomes. Then, the Health Transitions module predicts survival, health transitions, 
functional status, and quality-adjusted life-years for the next period, using estimated probabilities 
from multivariate regression models. The same process is repeated at each time step until 
everyone in the cohort has died. These simulations are used to compare expected lifetime 
outcomes across scenarios, such as the probability of onset of disease by a given age, life 
expectancy, and lifetime medical spending.  
3.3 Scenarios 
We use the FAM to investigate what would have happened if every American had health 
insurance during childhood based on the empirical estimates from Cohodes et al. (2016) on the 
impact of childhood health insurance on high school graduation rates and college completion.  In 
the hypertension intervention, we decrease the probability of having high blood pressure, as 
found by Boudreaux et al. (2016).  Table 1 shows the estimates that we integrate into our model.  
We then compare our intervention scenario to outcomes under the status quo, which are baseline 
FAM projections.  There are two main steps to implement the health insurance scenarios.  First, 
we identify the population that was likely to have been uninsured during childhood.  This is the 
population that we intervene on.  Second, we modify characteristics of this population using 
findings from the literature detailed above.    
One of the keys is determining who was not insured during childhood.  The PSID data do 
not contain information about childhood health insurance status of all respondents.  Thus, we 
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take two steps to identify individuals who were likely uninsured during childhood.  First, we use 
the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic March Supplement (CPS ASEC) to 
identify historical characteristics of the population who do not have health insurance during 
childhood.  Second, we randomly assign individuals from the PSID as being uninsured to match 
this distribution of observed characteristics.  Specifically, we use the 1988-2002 CPS to identify 
the race and maximum parental education of children who were uninsured during this time 
period.  We examine the cohort that was 25-26 in 2009, as this is the cohort that we use for 
simulations.2  It is important to note that the population of children who were uninsured during 
childhood are different from a nationally representative sample.  For example, uninsured children 
were more likely to be racial and ethnic minorities and from low education and income groups.   
We divide the population of uninsured children in this cohort into 12 categories and 
match this distribution across three racial groups and four education groups: Hispanic; Black, 
Non-Hispanic; and White or other race, Non-Hispanic; less than high school; high school 
graduates; some college; and a four year college degree or higher.  In addition to matching these 
characteristics identified using the CPS ASEC, we exclude individuals in the PSID who report 
growing up wealthy.  We match the distribution from the CPS using the PSID, Table 2 shows the 
results.  About 53 percent of the population that we assign as uninsured during childhood is 
white, non-Hispanic; 20 percent is Black, non-Hispanic; and 27 percent is Hispanic.  Across all 
races, children who have at least one parent who has obtained a Bachelor’s degree or higher are 
less likely to be uninsured.   
For the population that we identified as likely to be uninsured during childhood, we 
estimate what would have happened had they been insured.  Based on results from the literature 
cited in the previous section, we implement our intervention scenario based on two components: 
education and chronic conditions, namely hypertension. We increase both high school graduation 
and college completion, following the findings in Cohodes et al. (2016) as well as decrease the 
probability of having high blood pressure, as found in Boudreaux et al. (2016).  We forecast 
outcomes under three main scenarios.  First, we assume that providing health insurance improves 
                                                 
2 This corresponds to ages 4-18 for our initial cohort.  The CPS measured the status of health insurance for 
children differently prior to this period, and so for consistency reasons we restrict our timeframe.  Since uninsurance 
rates have been steadily declining in the last decades, we may be underestimating the percent of uninsured children, 
which would make our findings a lower bound.   
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both education and chronic conditions.  We then consider outcomes under an increase in 
education and a decrease in chronic conditions independently.  This allows us to see which 
intervention is driving our results, as well as to study the interaction of the combined 
intervention.   
Due to the endogeneity of health insurance coverage, previous literature has largely 
estimated the effects of being eligible for insurance, particularly Medicaid.  In order to calculate 
what the effect of actually taking up insurance, or the treatment on the treated, as opposed to the 
average treatment effect, we follow Cohodes et al. (2016)  and assume a take-up rate of Medicaid 
of 71.4 percent for ages 0-18.  This means that in all scenarios, we divide the findings in Table 1 
by this take up rate.   
For each educational outcome, college completion and high school graduation, we 
intervene on individuals who were identified as being uninsured during childhood in the first step 
and who were most likely to complete this level of schooling, but did not.  For example, we 
estimate college completion for individuals using a rich set of individual characteristics as 
controls, including race, parental education, whether the individual grew up in a low-income 
household, and self-reported child health.  Denote the predicted probability of college 
completion as ?̂?𝐶.  We then add a random normal draw, 𝑢𝑢 with mean 0 and standard deviation 
equal to the root mean square error of the model to this predicted value.  We rank individuals by 
?̂?𝐶 + 𝑢𝑢.  Individuals with the highest values are reassigned education to be college graduates until 
the amount reassigned is equivalent to an increase of 9.66 percentage points for the population 
identified as being uninsured during childhood.  We follow the same steps for high school, 
reassigning high school drop outs to graduates until the reassignment is equivalent to an increase 
of 5.32 percentage points for the population uninsured during childhood.  We reassign college 
before high school to avoid reassigning individuals from high school drop outs to college 
graduates.  
The second intervention is a reduction of high blood pressure prevalence.  We use the 
findings of Boudreaux et al. (2016), who found that the roll-out of Medicaid significantly 
reduced likelihood of high blood pressure in later life for children who had health insurance.  
Specifically, we reduce the probability of hypertension incidence in the simulations by a 
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multiplier such that there is a 12-percentage point decrease in the probability of having high 
blood pressure at age 54.3  
4. Results 
The simulation results show what would have happened had every child in the cohort age 
25 to 26 in 2009 had health insurance during childhood.  In each case, we show findings for the 
group of individuals who were marked as being uninsured during childhood as well as findings 
for the nationally representative cohort.  The uninsured group shows the impact on those 
receiving the treatment, and the nationally representative cohort is informative about the scale of 
the intervention for the population as a whole.  For the uninsured group, we also report results 
separately for both components of the intervention: educational increase and hypertension 
reduction.  
4.1 Health Outcomes 
Table 3 shows disease prevalence rates per 1000 individuals at age 45 and at age 65, 
lifetime incidence of disease, life expectancy, and disability free years of life for a cohort of 
individuals ages 25 or 26 in year 2009 without childhood health insurance and a nationally 
representative cohort of individuals ages 25 or 26 in year 2009 (including those with and without 
childhood health insurance).  We show results for the status quo scenario (no intervention) and 
for the scenario of childhood health insurance for those without for both samples.  Under the 
status quo, the uninsured group has a higher prevalence of cardiovascular disease, stroke, high 
blood pressure, diabetes, and lung disease at age 45 and at age 65, with the exception of 
prevalence of cancer.  They also have about half a year less life expectancy at age 25 and almost 
a full year less of disability free life years.   
In the intervention scenario, individuals who receive the benefits of health insurance have 
significant health improvements, which also improve health outcomes for the nationally 
representative cohort.  We find that lifetime incidence of nearly all major diseases decreases 
comparing the status quo 
                                                 
3 This prevalence reduction corresponds to the lower bound estimate of Boudreaux et al. (2016) and is used 
to provide a conservative estimate for the impact of health insurance. The incidence multiplier is obtained by 
conducting a grid search over potential multipliers and conducting cohort simulations until obtaining a 12-
percentage point reduction relative to the status quo for the population we intervene on at age 54.    
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 to the intervention for both the treated group (column 6) and the entire cohort (column 3).  The 
exception is an increase in cancer, largely due to the increased life expectancy.  Excluding 
cancer, we find improvements in all major chronic conditions throughout the life-span, as shown 
in Table 3 and Figure 4.  Intervening on the uninsured group results in a reduction of lifetime 
cardiovascular disease by 2.3 percent; stroke by 4.9 percent; diabetes by 1.8 percent; and lung 
disease by 1.2 percent.  The improvements in health, as a result of providing health insurance in 
childhood to the uninsured group, results in health improvements that by age 65 make this group 
indistinguishable from a nationally representative sample at age 65 in prevalence of 
cardiovascular disease, stroke, and high blood pressure.   
In addition to preventing disease, we estimate that the increased health insurance in 
childhood would lead to longer, healthier lives.  Panel B of Table 3 shows that the treated group 
has an increase in life expectancy of 0.9 years (column 6).  The increase in disability-free life 
years is even larger, 1.3 years.  Improvements in functional status are found both in terms of 
activities of daily living (ADLs) limitations, as well as instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADLs) limitations.  At every age, individuals in the uninsured group would be less likely to 
need help with three or more ADLs, as shown in Figure 3.  In addition they are less likely to 
need help with two or more IADLs, as shown in Figure 4.   
We investigate how much of the change in health is driven by an increase in educational 
attainment and how much is driven by a reduction in high blood pressure. We report results in 
Table 4.  With respect to cardiovascular disease, we found a reduction in prevalence at age 65 of 
about 7 percent relative to the status quo (Table 1).  About three-quarters of the reduction is 
driven by a reduction in the probability of having high blood pressure (Table 4).  With respect to 
diabetes, the 3 percent reduction is almost entirely driven by increases in educational attainment.   
Both health and education play important roles in increasing life expectancy as well as disability-
free life years.    
4.2 Economic Outcomes 
We analyze the impact of childhood health insurance on both lifetime medical spending, 
government transfers, and labor force participation. Table 5 shows that under the status quo, 
projected lifetime medical spending is similar for the nationally representative cohort and the 
cohort of individuals without childhood health insurance (Column 1 and 4).  However, the 
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uninsured group has larger expected lifetime disability benefits, about 14 percent, and about 11 
percent lower earnings than the cohort that includes both insured and uninsured.   
Comparing the status quo to the intervention scenario, we see only small changes in total 
medical spending (Column 6).  However, spending for Medicaid and Medicare is projected to 
fall by about 5 percent and 1.1 percent respectively. Increases in lifetime health care spending 
due to increased life expectancy is off-set by decreases in spending due to a reduction in disease. 
Figure 5 shows that the intervention reduces eligibility for Medicaid later in life.   
We also find that economic outcomes improve for the uninsured group with childhood 
health insurance.  Similar to Medicaid eligibility, we find that at every age, individuals in the 
uninsured group would be less likely to claim Disability Insurance (DI) if they were insured, as 
shown in Figure 6.  We also find that childhood health insurance increases the likelihood of full-
time work relative to the status quo (Figure 7).  This increase in the likelihood of working full 
time translates into an increase of 0.9 full-time work years, or 3.6 percent more full-time work 
years.  The increased earnings capacity, as well as the increased time spent working, translates 
into an increase in lifetime earnings of $109,000 (in 2015 dollars) or about 8.5 percent.   
The education component of the intervention has a direct impact on economic outcomes, 
while the hypertension reduction affects outcomes through its dynamic impact on disability, 
health, and longevity. For example, the results displayed in Table 6 show that the educational 
intervention leads to higher spending, since higher educational achievement is associated with 
higher medical spending. On the other hand, preventing hypertension is expected to lower 
lifetime medical spending. Overall, these two interventions almost exactly offset each other in 
their effect on medical spending.  Further, the expected decrease in Medicare spending is driven 
entirely by the reduction in hypertension, while the decrease in Medicaid spending is driven by 
the increase in education.  Looking at the government outlays and other economic outcomes, we 
find the education intervention has larger effects than the hypertension intervention.  For 
example, the effect of improved hypertension on disability claiming is just under half of the 
effect of increased educational attainment, while the effect on earnings is about 40 percent.   
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our findings support the interconnection between education, health, and economic 
outcomes found in other literatures (Smith (1999)).  By improving both health and education, 
insurance during childhood has lasting effects.  Our results are consistent with results from the 
prior work on the effects of increased education on health and mortality.  For example, in a 
seminal paper, Lleras Muney (2005) found that an additional year of schooling lowers the 
probability of dying in the next 10 years by 3 to 6 percentage points.  We find that increased 
educational attainment as a result of childhood health insurance increases life expectancy by 
about one-half year.  
Intervening with health insurance in childhood may improve adult outcomes more than 
some mid- and later-life health interventions.  For example, Gaudette et al. (2015) find that 
increasing statin use among older adults increases life expectancy by 1.4 years for healthy 51 
year olds.  However, they find that this is mainly an increase in unhealthy years.  In contrast, we 
find that childhood health insurance increases disability free life years by 1.34 years.     
Although our analysis considers what could have happened in the past, it also speaks to 
policies moving forward.   Given the gains in both health and economic outcomes from insuring 
children that we find, health insurance is a potential tool for improving later in life outcomes.  
The nature of health and human capital implies that interventions made in childhood may be 
particularly important (See Heckman and Masterov (2007)).  Further, children enrolled in 
Medicaid account for a relatively small portion of overall Medicaid spending (Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2011)). Since the Medicaid expansions of the 1980s, the uninsured rate of children 
has gradually fallen.  More recently, it has continued to fall, due in part to the Affordable Care 
Act.  However, there are still gains to be made in many areas.  For example, the uninsured rate 
varies across states and was as high as 13 percent in Arizona in 2015.  Further, there are large 
disparities of insurance by race and ethnicity.  As of 2014, the uninsured rate for Hispanic 
children remains nearly double that of white, non-Hispanic children (9.6 percent versus 4.9 
percent).   Insuring all children may be one way to close the gap in health and economic 
outcomes for minority populations.    
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Tables  
Table 1: Findings Brought into the FAM 
Education Findings 
Cohodes et al. 
(2016) 
• 10 percentage point increase in average Medicaid eligibility between 0-17 
decreased the high school dropout rate by .38 percentage point (standard deviation of 
.015).   
• 10 percentage point increase in average Medicaid eligibility between 0-17 
increased college completion by .69 percentage point (standard deviation of .032).   
Chronic conditions 
Boudreaux et 
al. (2016) 
• Moving from no to full exposure to Medicaid during early childhood (age 
0-5) decreased the probability of hypertension in adulthood by 22 percentage points 
(standard deviation of 0.10) for low-income individuals (<150% of the federal 
poverty line). 
 
Table 2: Population Uninsured during Childhood 
 CPS Intervention Group in FAM 
Hispanic, LT HS 0.124 0.124 
Hispanic, HS 0.084 0.081 
Hispanic, Some College 0.042 0.043 
Hispanic, BA+ 0.018 0.018 
White, Non-Hispanic, LT 
HS 
0.060 0.060 
White, Non-Hispanic, HS 0.221 0.221 
White, Non-Hispanic, Some 
College 
0.159 0.160 
White, Non-Hispanic, BA+ 0.095 0.096 
Black, Non-Hispanic, LT HS 0.036 0.036 
Black, Non-Hispanic, HS 0.087 0.088 
Black, Non-Hispanic, Some 
College 
0.053 0.053 
Black, Non-Hispanic, BA+ 0.020 0.020 
   
Total Hispanic 0.269 0.266 
Total Black, Non-Hispanic 0.196 0.197 
Total White, Non-Hispanic  0.535 0.537 
The first column shows summary statistics for uninsured children from the March 
supplement of the Current Population Survey 1988-2002.  Cells are broken down by child’s race 
and the maximum education obtained by a member of the household: less than high school (LT 
HS), high school degree (HS), some college, and Bachelor’s degree or higher (BA+).  The 
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second column shows these summary statistics for the group that is marked as uninsured during 
childhood in the simulations.   
Table 3: Health Outcomes 
 
Nationally Representative 
Cohort Uninsured Individuals 
 
Status 
Quo 
Increased Health 
Insurance 
Status 
Quo 
Increased Health 
Insurance 
 
Level Level Difference Level Level Difference 
Panel A. Disease Prevalence (per 1000) 
   At Age 45  
     Cardiovascular 
Disease 104 103 -1.07 106 99 -7.41 
Stroke 23 23 -0.35 28 25 -2.46 
Cancer 43 43 0.17 42 44 1.18 
High Blood 
Pressure 338 324 -13.68 361 266 -94.9 
Diabetes 110 109 -0.64 124 120 -4.43 
Lung Disease 78 77 -0.44 83 80 -3.06 
At Age 65  
     Cardiovascular 
Disease 322 319 -3.36 326 303 -23.32 
Stroke 107 105 -1.92 110 96 -13.28 
Cancer 176 177 0.76 166 171 5.42 
High Blood 
Pressure 734 715 -19.35 758 624 -134.14 
Diabetes 328 327 -1.58 366 355 -11.47 
Lung Disease 179 178 -0.64 188 184 -4.55 
       Panel A2. Lifetime Incidence of Diseases 
   Cardiovascular 
Disease 642 640 -2.17 641 626 -15.02 
Stroke 358 355 -2.48 350 332 -17.18 
Cancer 386 388 2.84 358 377 19.68 
High Blood 
Pressure 872 860 -12.35 882 797 -85.63 
Diabetes 472 471 -1.35 516 507 -9.38 
Lung Disease 324 324 -0.59 338 334 -4.11 
       Panel B. Expected Lifetime Outcomes at Age 25 
  Life Expectancy 
(years) 54.98 55.11 0.13 54.41 55.32 0.91 
Disability-free 
Life-years 41.35 41.54 0.19 40.43 41.77 1.34 
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Table 4: Health Outcomes by Intervention 
 
Status 
Quo 
Difference with Status Quo 
 
Increased Health 
Insurance 
Educational 
Benefits Only 
Hypertension 
Benefits Only 
Panel A. Disease Prevalence (per 1000) 
 At Age 45 
    Cardiovascular 
Disease 106 -7.41 -3.34 -4.17 
Stroke 28 -2.46 -1.37 -1.12 
Cancer 42 1.18 1.17 0 
High Blood 
Pressure 361 -94.9 -0.53 -94.34 
Diabetes 124 -4.43 -4.44 0 
Lung Disease 83 -3.06 -3.16 0.09 
At Age 65 
    Cardiovascular 
Disease 326 -23.32 -5.39 -17.96 
Stroke 110 -13.28 -5.64 -8.09 
Cancer 166 5.42 5.13 0.38 
High Blood 
Pressure 758 -134.14 -1.9 -131.52 
Diabetes 366 -11.47 -12.59 1.14 
Lung Disease 188 -4.55 -5.53 1.06 
     Panel A2. Lifetime Incidence of Diseases 
 Cardiovascular 
Disease 641 -15.02 -0.27 -15.04 
Stroke 350 -17.18 -5.43 -11.73 
Cancer 358 19.68 14.65 5.31 
High Blood 
Pressure 882 -85.63 1.43 -86.82 
Diabetes 516 -9.38 -12.56 3.27 
Lung Disease 338 -4.11 -7.32 3.23 
     Panel B. Expected Lifetime Outcomes at Age 25 
Life Expectancy 
(years) 54.41 0.91 0.51 0.4 
Disability-free 
Life-years 40.43 1.34 0.74 0.59 
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Table 5: Economic Outcomes 
 
Nationally Representative 
Cohort Uninsured Individuals 
 
Status 
Quo 
Increased Health 
Insurance 
Status 
Quo 
Increased Health 
Insurance 
 
Level Level Difference Level Level Difference 
Panel A. Lifetime Medical Spending at Age 25 ($1000s) 
 Total 439.84 439.76 -0.09 437.3 436.7 -0.6 
Medicare 152.79 152.54 -0.25 157.11 155.37 -1.74 
Medicaid 73.15 72.59 -0.57 79.55 75.62 -3.94 
  
Panel B. Economic Outcomes & Government Outlays 
 Lifetime DI Benefits 6438.23 6270.6 -167.63 7520.06 6352.09 -1167.96 
Lifetime SS Benefits 
($1000s) 129.89 129.87 -0.01 130.11 130.07 -0.05 
Lifetime Earnings 
($1000s) 1446.72 1462.37 15.65 1282 1390.51 108.51 
Full-time Years 25.08 25.21 0.13 24.34 25.22 0.88 
All amounts are presented in present values at age 25, calculated with a 3 percent interest 
rate.  DI refers to disability insurance and SS refers to social security.  Full-time years are the 
number of years that the individual is working full-time.   
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Table 6: Economic Outcomes by Intervention 
 
Status 
Quo 
Difference with Status Quo 
 
Increased 
Health 
Insurance 
Educational 
Benefits Only 
Hypertension 
Benefits Only 
Panel A. Lifetime Medical Spending ($1000s) 
Total 437.3 -0.6 5.16 -5.76 
Medicare 157.11 -1.74 0.53 -2.31 
Medicaid 79.55 -3.94 -4.56 0.63 
     Panel B. Economic Outcomes & Government Outlays 
Lifetime DI 
Benefits 7520.06 -1167.96 -827.36 -375.46 
Lifetime SS 
Benefits ($1000s) 130.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
Lifetime Earnings 
($1000s) 1282 108.51 93.08 14.33 
Full-time Years 24.34 0.88 0.62 0.26 
All amounts are presented in present values at age 25, calculated with a 3 percent interest 
rate.  DI refers to disability insurance and SS refers to social security.  Full-time years are the 
number of years that the individual is working full-time.   
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Figures  
Figure 1: Core Modules of the Future Americans Model 
 
 
Figure 2: Change in Chronic Conditions in Intervention Scenario Relative to the Status Quo 
 
The intervention outcome corresponds to the uninsured group gaining the benefits of 
insurance during childhood, including both improved educational outcomes and a decrease in the 
likelihood of becoming hypertensive.  
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Figure 3: Likelihood of Needing Assistance with 3 or More Activities of Daily Living 
 
The intervention outcome corresponds to the uninsured group gaining the benefits of 
insurance during childhood, including both improved educational outcomes and a decrease in the 
likelihood of becoming hypertensive.  
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Figure 4: Likelihood of Needing Assistance with 2 or More Instrumental Activities  
of Daily Living 
 
The intervention outcome corresponds to the uninsured group gaining the benefits of 
insurance during childhood, including both improved educational outcomes and a decrease in the 
likelihood of becoming hypertensive.  
Figure 5: Percent of Cohort Eligible for Medicaid
 
The intervention outcome corresponds to the uninsured group gaining the benefits of 
insurance during childhood, including both improved educational outcomes and a decrease in the 
likelihood of becoming hypertensive.  
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Figure 6: Probability of Claiming Disability Insurance
 
The intervention outcome corresponds to the uninsured group gaining the benefits of 
insurance during childhood, including both improved educational outcomes and a decrease in the 
likelihood of becoming hypertensive.  
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Figure 7: Probability of Working Full-time 
 
The intervention outcome corresponds to the uninsured group gaining the benefits of 
insurance during childhood, including both improved educational outcomes and a decrease in the 
likelihood of becoming hypertensive.  
 
 
 
